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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Daniel A. Ligon-Bruno appeals from a judgment of conviction for destruction,
alteration, or concealment of evidence based on his conditional guilty plea entered after
the denial of his motion to suppress.

On appeal, Mr. Ligon-Bruno asserts that the

district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence found during three
warrantless searches of his home because the State failed to satisfy its "heavy burden"
of proving an exception to the warrant requirement.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This case began when law enforcement officers responded to a "burglary in
progress" call at Mr. Ligon-Bruno's apartment. (Tr.VoLl, 1 p.9, Ls.11-21; p.30, Ls.5-12.)
A witness had called 911 to report seeing a man crawl through an outside window, open
the front door, unscrew the front light bulb, reenter the apartment through the door, and
leave through the window. (Tr.Vol. I, p.10, Ls.4-12.) Deputy Franssen of the Kootenai
County Sheriff's Department was the last of four law enforcement officers who initially
responded to the call. 2 (Tr.Vol.I, p.11, Ls.10-13, p.87, Ls.23-25.) By the time Deputy
Franssen arrived, another deputy had stopped the suspect, 3 who claimed to be a

1

Two transcripts were prepared for appeal. One contains transcripts from hearings on
the motion to suppress conducted on June 18 and June 23, 2010, as well as the guilty
plea and sentencing hearings, held on February 7, 2011, and March 23, 2011,
respectively. For ease of reference, appellate counsel has labeled that transcript as
volume I. The other transcript is from another hearing on the motion to suppress held
on October 1, 2010, which appellate counsel has labeled as volume II.
2
The other three officers were Deputy Bixby, Deputy Moffett, and Deputy Ellis.
Fr.Vol.I, p.87, Ls.23-25.) Another officer, Detective Brandel, arrived later. (Tr.Vol.I, p.
The suspect was later identified as "Mr. Steger." (Tr.Vol. I, p.41, Ls.5-11.)

1

resident of the apartment, in front of the apartment complex. 4 (Tr.Vol.I, p.13, L.23 p.14, L.23.)
Deputy Franssen, accompanied by Deputy Bixby, then approached the secondfloor apartment to investigate. They noticed that the window, which was obscured by
mini-blinds, was open approximately one to two inches, with a small security camera "in
between two of the miniblinds." (Tr.Vol.I, p.14, L.24- p.17, L.1.) They then conducted
a "knock and announce," in which Deputy Franssen knocked on the front door and
announced, in a "[l]oud" voice, that he was with the sheriff's department, and, having
received no response, Deputy Bixby knocked on the window, and "yelled in through the
open portion of the window" in a "[l]oud" voice.

Deputy Bixby testified that they

"pound[ed] the door" and "yell[ed]: 'Sheriff's Department.

Open up."' (Tr.Vol.I, p.95,

Ls.24-25.) After receiving no response, Deputy Franssen went downstairs to speak with
Mr. Steger to find out if there was anyone else in the apartment.

Mr. Steger gave

conflicting answers, first denying that anyone else was in the apartment, then admitting
that his roommates might be inside, before again denying that anyone else was inside.
Deputy Bixby remained upstairs and "maintained a visual on the apartment[.]" (Tr.Vol.I,
p.14, L.24 - p.20, L.6.)
The Initial Contact With Mr. Ligon-Bruno

Next, Deputy Bixby, accompanied by Deputy Ellis, "slid the window open[] [and]
pushed the blinds out of the way so we could get a clear view into the apartment."
Deputy Bixby later acknowledged that his hands had entered the apartment in order to
move the blinds.

(Tr.Vol.I, p.120, Ls.8-10.)

4

He then announced that the sheriff's

Mr. Steger matched the description, both with respect to physical characteristics and
clothing, of the person described by the 911 caller. (Tr.Vol.I, p.41, Ls.8-11.)
2

department was there, asked if anyone was inside, and ordered anyone inside to come
out. At that point, Mr. Ligon-Bruno appeared, "peeked his head out around the corner
[and] [a]sked what are we doing there?"

Deputy Bixby told him to "'[s]tep this

direction[,]"' and, when he started for the door, ordered him to exit through the window.
(Tr.Vol.I, p.96, L.8 - p.99, L.5.)
Deputy Franssen testified that, while interviewing Mr. Steger downstairs, he
heard Deputy Bixby "yelling: 'Let me see your hands."' Deputy Franssen's reaction was
to run upstairs, at which point he observed Deputy Bixby and another deputy "having a
male step out of the window that was now open onto the balcony where he was
detained."

In further questioning, Deputy Franssen described, in greater detail, the

process by which Mr. Ligon-Bruno exited the apartment. He explained, "He was being
assisted out of the window. He wasn't being pulled to the extent that he was completely
off balance ... I believe deputies maintained control of his hands ... while maintaining
control of his ability to cause harm to officers, he was brought out of the window."
(Tr.Vol.I, p.22, Ls.9-23.) That man was verbally-identified as Mr. Ligon-Bruno, placed in
handcuffs, and asked whether anyone else was in the apartment. Mr. Ligon-Bruno then
"stated that Luca was still inside the apartment." Mr. Ligon-Bruno also indicated that he
had been asleep inside before he went to the window. Deputy Franssen then called for
Luca to exit the apartment. Luca exited the apartment, and was detained in handcuffs.
(Tr.Vol.I, p.19, L.7 - p.25, L.6.)
The apartment complex to which the police had responded was one of two
"[r]elatively small" complexes that are next to each other. Each complex has fewer than
fifteen apartments, and both are located on a single block "on the north side of
Wyoming Avenue[.]" (Tr.Vol.I, p.77, Ls.4-9.) Prior to anyone entering Mr. Ligon-Bruno's
3

apartment (Tr.Vol.I, p.82, Ls.10-20), police attempted to verify Mr. Steger's claim that he
lived in the apartment by calling his mother. According to Deputy Franssen,
Central dispatch contacted her by telephone. And she was able to provide
that she knew that he lived in an apartment across from Ziggy's, which is
on the south side of Wyoming but no particular number or couldn't even
identify to the best of my knowledge which apartment complex it was.
(Tr.Vol.I, p.80, Ls.3-19.)
Initial Entry Into The Apartment

Deputy Bixby testified that. after Luca, Mr. Ligon-Bruno, and Mr. Steger were
handcuffed, he entered the apartment through the window. After Deputy Bixby's entry
through the window, it was discovered that the reason that the front door was not being
used as the main entrance was because it had been taped shut after a recent break-in.
(Tr.Vol.I, p.66, Ls.8-16.)
Leaving the other deputies outside, Deputy Bixby testified,
[I] [w]alked straight into the apartment towards the hallway, cleared the
kitchen, which was the first room adjacent to the living room. Looking
down the hallway the bedroom was the next door on the left. There was, I
believe, a closet somewhere in the hallway.
(Tr.Vol.I, p.101, Ls.12-19.) Deputy Bixby said that he did this "to make sure nobody
else was inside the house" and described it as "a quick sweep[.]" (Tr.Vol.I, p.101, L.23
- p.102, L.7.)
During this sweep, Deputy Bixby noticed several items, including "burnt
marijuana cigarettes, rolling papers" and "a soda can or energy drink can ... that was
punctured ... [andJ had burnt residue on it made for smoking."

He also noticed

"numerous weapons . . . in the living room and throughout the house[,]" including

4

baseball bats, knives, and a hatchet. 5 He described both bedrooms as "just a mess."
(Tr.Vol.I, p.103, L.22 - p.104, L.18.)

On cross-examination, the following exchange

occurred:
[Defense counsel:] When you made that sweep, sir, that first sweep as
counsel puts it, what indications did you find that
would lead you to believe that someone else was
armed or dangerous or anything like that inside the
residence?
[Deputy Bixby:]

Once I was inside?

[Defense counsel:] Yes, sir.
[Deputy Bixby:]

Nothing. That's what a safety sweep is. You go in,
check the residence, come back out.

(Tr.Vol.I, p.121, L.20-p.122, L.2 (emphases added).)
Second Entry Into the Apartment
Deputy Bixby then went to the front door, 6 opened it, and he and the other
deputies brought the still-handcuffed Luca and IVlr. Ligon-Bruno into the apartment, and
"had them sit down in the chairs in the living room." (Tr.Vol. I, p.102, Ls.8-19, p.106,
L.23-p.107, L.3.)
During a second sweep of the apartment, deputies heard the toilet running, and
removed the lid from the toilet tank, discovering "something that did not belong inside
the toilet tank. And at that point we just left it inside the toilet tank." (Tr.Vol.I, p.104,
L.19 - p.106, L.19.) Deputy Bixby deduced that the items in the toilet tank were the
cause of the continuous running of the toilet because they appeared to be interfering

5

The State, either in argument or through its witnesses, never contended that there was
anything unlawful about the "weapons" observed inside the apartment.
6
After Deputy Bixby's entry, it was discovered that the reason that the front door was
not being used as the main entrance was because it had been taped shut after a recent
break-in. (Tr.Vol.I, p.66, Ls.8-16.)
5

with the mechanism that stops the water from 'flowing. He did not remove the items or
do anything else to stop the water from continuing to run. (Tr.Vol. I, p.110, Ls.1-18.)
Deputy Franssen then learned that Mr. Ligon-Bruno was on felony probation,
contacted the probation department, and received permission from a probation officer to
search the home.

It was only after receiving this permission that Deputy Franssen

removed the items from the toilet tank, discovering two digital scales, "200 small, plastic
Ziplock-type bags, hyperdermic [sic] needles, spoons, scrapers, straws."

Deputy

Franssen also searched the drawers in the bathroom after speaking with the probation
department, discovering additional hypodermic needles, "playing cards that had been
cut and modified, dirty spoons with residue on them that appeared to be consistent with
the use of methamphetamine. A shaving bag that was located on the counter in the
bathroom that contained a ledger." (Tr.Vol.I, p.35, L.1 -p.40, L.15.)
At the hearing on his motion to suppress, at the request of both parties, tl1e
district court took judicial notice of three documents from Kootenai County Criminal
Case No. 05-17960, the case for which Mr. Ligon-Bruno was on unsupervised probation
at the time of the instant offense. The first was the withheld judgment and sentencing
disposition, containing, inter alia, terms and conditions of probation, including paragraph
19, which states, "You shall submit to searches of your person, personal property,
automobiles, and residence without a search warrant at the request of your probation
officer."
Summary.

The second was the Petition for Unsupervised Probation and Case in
The third was the district court's order converting Mr. Ligon-Bruno's

probation to unsupervised probation, signed on May 22, 2008, 7 which ordered that he

7

The searches of Mr. Ligon-Bruno's home that led to the charges in t~1is case occurred
on January 4, 2010. (R., p.10.)
6

be "discharged from further supervised probation to unsupervised probation under all
previously ordered terms and conditions until February 21 st [, 2010]." (Tr.Vol.I, p.145,
L.2-p.147, L.11.)
Following a preliminary hearing, Mr. Ligon-Bruno was charged with possession of
a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. (R., pp.37, 48-49.) Defense counsel
then filed a motion to suppress the evidence, requesting that all evidence gathered
against Mr. Ligon-Bruno, including any statements, be suppressed because the
warrantless search of his home violated both the United States Constitution and the
Idaho Constitution. Mr. Ligon-Bruno also sought suppression of any statements made
by the defendant, and any derivative evidence, because the statements were obtained
while he was unlawfully detained in violation of both the United States Constitution and
the Idaho Constitution. Finally, he sought suppression of any evidence obtained from a
warrantless search of his cell phone.

(R., pp.58-59.)

Defense counsel filed a

memorandum in support of the motion to suppress (R., p.62), the State filed a response
(R., p. 72), and the parties filed further memoranda on additional issues that arose after
the evidentiary hearings and the earlier memoranda. (R., pp.95, 102, 107.)
Defense counsel advanced several arguments in support of suppression, two of
which are relevant on appeal. First, he argued that the warrantless entry into 1\/lr. LigonBruno's apartment violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I,

section 17, of the Idaho Constitution, and required

suppression of all resulting evidence, including statements made by Mr. Ligon-Bruno.
(R., pp.63-64.)

In a supplemental memorandum, defense counsel argued, inter alia,

that "[b]ut for the initial warrantless entry, there is no indication that a probation search
of this unsupervised probationer would have occurred[.]" (R., pp.102-06.)
7

Following argument on the motion, the district court issued an order granting the
motion to suppress with respect to the contents of Mr. Ligon-Bruno's cell phone, while
denying it in all other respects. (R., p.157.) The district court announced its findings of
fact and conclusions of law in open court.

(Tr.Vol.II, p.11, L.21 - p.27, L.16.)

The

district court's holdings were that Deputy Bixby's initial sweep of the apartment was
justified based on exigent circumstances. Specifically, the district court found,
At this point the police did not know whether the man who was leaving the
apartment belonged there. The police did not know whether there was a
burglary going on in process. They did not know whether there were
further perpetrators of a possible burglary within that apartment. They did
not know whether there were potential victims of serious crime within that
apartment who needed immediate and serious care of law enforcement.
They had exigent circumstances to enter that apartment and find out if
their presence was needed for very serious reasons for the safety of
citizens' ongoing safety.
(Tr.Vol.II, p.14, Ls.6-21.)
With respect to the second entry, the district court concluded,
The Court finds that to be not necessarily a reentry of the house. The
police are already in the house. They are already conducting a safety
sweep of that house. And just the fact that they bring the suspects into
the house and then continue that safety sweep in a bit more detail does
not mean that there was a reentry or that the safety sweep had lost its
legitimacy and importance. The further, more detailed safety sweep was
legitimate under the circumstances, and the Court finds it to be
constitutionally supportable.
(Tr.Vol.II, p.16, L.21 - p.17, L.5.)
As for the lifting of the toilet's lid during the second entry, the district court
concluded,
The Court finds that it was reasonable for the police to lift the lid of that
toilet to find out what was going on under exigent circumstances, given the
circumstances of seeing the paraphernalia and the smell of burning
marijuana and a continuously running toilet. There was the distinct
likelihood that items of evidence were either being destroyed or in the
water that was running continuously in the tank of that toilet.
8

(Tr.Vol.II, p.18, L.24- p.19, L.7.)
Finally, with respect to the probation justification, the district court concluded,
The Court specifically finds that under
based upon the exigent circumstances,
upon what was seen in plain view
circumstances, that the police were not
the probation officer as a means
requirement.

these particular circumstances,
entry into this residence based
as a result of those exigent
simply requesting permission of
of circumventing the warrant

This Court does not find that the request had to be made by a specific
probation officer specifically to Mr. Ligon-Bruno.

The Court finds that, under all of these circumstances, this was a
reasonable search of the apartment and is constitutionally supportable
under the probation search exception to the warrant requirement.
(Tr.Vol.II, p.26, Ls.14-25.)
Following the partial denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Ligon-Bruno and the
State entered into a Rule 11 plea agreement, the terms of which the district court
summarized as follows:
The Court has reviewed the plea agreement ... [it] calls for the State to file
an Amended Information that accuses Mr. Ligon-Bruno with the felony
offense of destruction of evidence.

The plea agreement then calls from Mr. Ligon-Bruno to plead guilty
pursuant to Alford v. North Caro/ina[ 8 ] to that amended charge of
destruction of evidence. This will also be a conditional guilty plea wherein
Mr. Ligon-Bruno reserves the right to appeal the Court's denial of the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. And then this is offered to the
Court under a binding Rule 11 (f) basis where the parties agree and ask
the Court to be bound by that agreement of a suspended prison sentence,
no more county jail than what has already been served as a condition of
probation, and three years of supervised probation. The Court would set
the underlying sentence at its discretion.
8

See Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
9

(Tr.Vol.I, p.157, L.14 - p.158, L.11.) Mr. Ligon-Bruno pleaded guilty pursuant to this
agreement. (Tr.Vol.I, p.167, Ls.7-12.)
At sentencing, the district court followed the agreement, imposed and suspended
a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed, and placed Mr. Ligon-Bruno on
three years of supervised probation.

(Tr.Vol. I, p.187, Ls.1-4.)

Mr. Ligon-Bruno then

filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (Notice of Appeal. 9)

9

A file-stamped copy of the Notice of Appeal is attached to a Motion to Augment filed
on November 23, 2011.
10

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ligon-Bruno's motion to suppress evidence
discovered during three warrantless searches of his home because the State failed to
meet its "heavy burden" of proving an exception to the warrant requirement?

11

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ligon-Bruno's Motion To Suppress
Evidence Discovered During Three Warrantless Searches Of His Home Because The
State Failed To Meet Its "Heavy Burden" Of Proving An Exception To The Warrant
Requirement
A.

Introduction
Mr. Ligon-Bruno asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to

suppress evidence discovered during three 10 warrantless searches of his home. First,
the district court erred when it concluded that the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirement justified the initial entry into his home because the State failed
to meet its "heavy burden" of proof for that exception. Second, assuming that the initial
entry was justified, the district court erred when it concluded that the second warrantless
entry was not a reentry of the home, and in holding that it was justified as a continuing
protective sweep.

Finally, the district court erred when it concluded that the third

search, conducted at the request of a probation officer, was lawful.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ligon-Bruno's Motion To Suppress
Evidence Discovered During Three Warrantless Searches Of His Home Because
The State Failed To Meet Its "Heavy Burden" Of Proving An Exception To The
Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

10

Mr. Ligon-Bruno has classified the various police intrusions into three searches
because each resulted in the discovery and seizure of different pieces of evidence. The
first occurred when Deputy Bixby entered to conduct his "safety sweep." The second
occurred when the other deputies entered the apartment with the handcuffed Mr. LigonBruno and Luca. The third occurred after a probation officer authorized a thorough
search of the apartment.
12

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution contains a nearlyidentical provision.
"Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.

The burden of proof

rests with the State to demonstrate that the search either fell within a well-recognized
exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances."

State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995).

0

[T]he police bear a

heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify
warrantless searches or arrests." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984).
In his motion to suppress, Mr. Ligon-Bruno argued that the State had
unconstitutionally searched his home without a warrant. (R., pp.63-64.) At the outset of
the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State acknowledged that, due to the
warrantless nature of the search, it bore the burden of establishing an exception to the
warrant requirement. (Tr.Vol.I, p.8, Ls.7-10.) See Weaver, 127 Idaho at 290.
The State advanced two arguments 11 in justifying the warrantless searches of

Mr. Ligon-Bruno's home. First, the State argued that Mr. Ligon-Bruno's "probationary
status effectively reduced [his] 4th Amendment rights and subjected his home and
person to search." (R., p.72.) Second, at argument on the motion to suppress, the
State argued that the police had "reasonable cause" to believe that a burglary was
being committed, and that they were engaged in conducting "a protective sweep, trying

11

In its initial response to Mr. Ligon-Bruno's motion to suppress, the State advanced an
additional argument, asserting that Mr. Ligon-Bruno consented to the search of his
home. (R., pp.81-85.) This claim was unsupported, and indeed contradicted, by
evidence adduced at the suppression hearing. (Tr.Vol.I, p.25, Ls.19-24 (Deputy
Franssen explaining that Deputy Bixby entered the apartment through the window as
soon as Mr. Ligon-Bruno and Luca had been removed); p.100, Ls.11-21 (Deputy Bixby
explaining that he entered the apartment through the window after having "secured"
Mr. Ligon-Bruno and Luca).) The district court did not rule on the State's consent
argument.
13

to see if there are any victims, if there is anybody else in there" when they discovered,
"in plain view ... many, many items of paraphernalia and many, many weapons." 12
(Tr.Vol.II, p.9, L.21 - p.10, L.18.)

The State closed by reemphasizing its probation

argument, arguing, "If the Court finds that they had no justifiable reason to be there in
that apartment, then we look at the probation conditions." (Tr.Vol. II, p.10, Ls.19-23.)
For the reasons set forth below, the State failed to meet its "heavy burden" of
proof as to the exigent circumstances exception, and the probation exception argument
is unpersuasive because the probation search was not valid.

1.

The State Failed To Meet Its "Heavy Burden" Of Proof That The Initial
Entry Was Justified By The Exigent Circumstances Exception

Mr. Ligon-Bruno asserts that the district court's holding that the initial warrantless
entry into his home was justified under exigent circumstances, specifically the belief in
the possibility that a burglary had been committed and that either victims or perpetrators
were still inside, was erroneous because the State failed to meet its "heavy burden" of
proof on the issue.
In State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908 (Ct. App. 2006), the Idaho Court of Appeals
ably and eloquently summarized the law concerning the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement of the State and federal constitutions as follows:
Under the exigent circumstances exception, agents of the state may
engage in warrantless searches when there is compelling need for official
action and no time to secure a warrant. However, a warrantless search
under this exception must be strictly circumscribed by the nature of the
exigency that justifies the intrusion. The test for application of this warrant
exception is whether the facts as known to the agent at the time of entry,
together with reasonable inferences, would warrant a reasonable belief

12

Although it appears that the State was attempting to make an exigent circumstances
argument, it never used the term, nor did it cite to any case law in support of its
argument. (Tr.Vol.II, p.9, L.20 - p.11, L.16.)
14

that an exigency justified the intrusion. The burden is on the state to show
the applicability of this exception to the warrant requirement.
Id. at 912 (internal citations omitted).

Idaho appellate courts have considered the applicability of the exigent
circumstances exception to suspected burglaries several times.

State v. Araiza, 147

Idaho 371 (Ct. App. 2009) involved a remarkably similar initial suspicion of a residential
burglary. In that case, an officer was on patrol at approximately 11 p.m. when he saw a
man standing near the window of a house. "It appeared to the officer that the man had
either just left the house through the window or was attempting to enter through the
window." Id. at 373.
The officer stopped to investigate, but by the time he had parked, the man was
no longer visible. He knocked on the door, and an elderly woman, identified as Mary
Mosqueda, who lived there answered. She told the officer that the name of the man he
had seen was Roy, explained that he was inside, and said "that everything was fine." At
the officer's request, Ms. Mosqueda had Roy approach the front door, at which point the
officer obtained his full name (Roland Araiza), date of birth, and social security number.
While the first officer checked Araiza's information in his patrol car, another officer
"stood with Araiza at the door." Araiza, wearing only jeans, asked that officer if he could
reenter the residence to get some additional clothing. After receiving permission, Araiza
reentered the residence and closed the front door. Id.
After failing to verify Araiza's identity, the first officer rejoined the second officer
at the front door. They knocked, no one answered, and they discovered that the front
door had been locked. A neighbor, identifying herself as Ms. Mosqueda's daughter,
then arrived, "claimed not to know anyone by Araiza's name and told the officers that
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there should be no one in the house aside from her mother and the daughter's two
young sons." Next,
[t]he officers and Mosqueda's daughter continued knocking on the door
and windows of the residence and the daughter tried to call her mother on
her cell phone, but no one responded and the officers heard no noise
coming from the house. A young man, later identified as Mosqueda's
grandson, drove up to the scene, and also told the officer that he did not
recognize Araiza's name and that no other adult should be in his
grandmother's house.
After several minutes of trying to contact the house's occupants, the
officers could see through the windows that Mosqueda and Araiza were in
the southwest corner of the house. Concerned for the safety of Mosqueda
and her grandsons, the officers forcibly entered the home by breaking
down a door. They found Araiza in the back bedroom with Mosqueda,
where they arrested him for obstructing a police investigation. Mosqueda
then informed them that she had not responded to their shouts and
knocking because Araiza had not allowed anyone to answer the door.
When asked whether Araiza had any additional clothing to take with him,
Mosqueda led the officers to another bedroom and pointed to a jacket and
unzipped duffel bag on the floor. Inside the bag, a glass pipe containing
burn residue was clearly visible and a subsequent search of the bag
revealed additional drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine.
Id.

After being charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of
drug paraphernalia, Araiza filed a motion to suppress, challenging the warrantless entry
into the home. The district court denied the motion and Araiza appealed Id.
In affirming the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, the Court outlined
the facts supporting a finding of exigent circumstances as follows:
[W]hile his identity remained unclear, Araiza closed and locked the front
door and none of the residents would open the door, answer the phone, or
respond to knocking on the windows and beckoning from the officers. The
officers were provided further reason to be concerned when a woman who
identified herself as Mosqueda's daughter denied recognizing Araiza's
name and informed them there should be no one else in the residence
aside from Mosqueda and the daughter's two young children.
Additionally, Mosqueda's grandson arrived on the scene and also denied
recognizing Araiza's name and agreed with Mosqueda's daughter that no
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one else should be in the home aside from his grandmother and two
young cousins.
Id. at 375-76.

According to the Court, these facts gave officers "a reasonable concern that
Araiza was an intruder and holding Mosqueda against her will."

As for Araiza's

argument that Mosqueda's "calm demeanor ... and assurances that everything was
fine[,]" the Court concluded that "[g]iven the ignorance of Araiza's identity claimed by
family members on the scene, it was not unreasonable for the officers to doubt
Mosqueda's assurances." Id. at 376.
In another case in which it considered the warrantless police entry into a home
following the report of a possible intruder, the Idaho Court of Appeals, in State v. Rusho,
110 Idaho 556 (Ct. App. 1986), held that
even though the possibility of an intruder had not been wholly eliminated,
we do not believe that such a bare possibility is sufficient to justify a
warrantless, nonconsensual search. This is a question of constitutional
dimension, weighing the state's interest in public safety against a citizen's
right to maintain the privacy of her home. Fourth amendment values
would be gravely impaired if the mere report of an intruder became a
license for the police to enter a home and to search it without a warrant,
over the homeowner's objection. A balance must be struck. We hold that
such warrantless and nonconsensual searches are permissible only if
there is probable cause to believe that an intruder exists and it reasonably
appears that persons or property are in immediate danger. The initial
report of an intruder, uncorroborated by other facts, is insufficient to
overcome a homeowner's right to say "forget it."
Id. at 560 (emphasis added).

Unlike the facts in Araiza, once Mr. Ligon-Bruno and Luca had been removed
from the apartment, there was no reason for the police to believe that anyone else was
still inside. Additionally, prior to entering the apartment, the police had already verified,
via Mr. Steger's mother, that he lived in one of the less than thirty apartments on that
block. (Tr.Vol.I, p.80, Ls.3-19.) Finally, officers made no attempt to verify Mr. Ligon17

Bruno's claim that he lived in the apartment until after they had conducted two
searches.

(Tr.Vol.I, p.35, Ls.16-23.) A simple call to the probation department, as

eventually happened, would have resulted in the discovery that Mr. Ligon-Bruno had
lived at the apartment for at least twenty months. (Tr.Vol.I, p.131, L.25 - p.132, L.10
(Mr. Ligon-Bruno's former probation officer testifying that he last visited his apartment
on April 16, 2008, and that it was his belief that it was still Mr. Ligon-Bruno's
residence).)

The State failed to establish facts to support a finding that exigent

circumstances justified the initial entry into his apartment, which resulted in the
discovery of drug paraphernalia, as well as the second and third searches, which
disclosed the evidence which led to his conviction.
As the Court of Appeals cautioned in Rusho, in exigent circumstances cases, "a
balance must be struck" between legitimate public safety concerns and the right to be
secure in one's home. Where, as here, the police possessed, at most, a belief that it
was "entirely possible that a burglary, a theft, or other crime had been committed inside
of the residence[,]" 13 such a belief was insufficient to support a finding that probable
cause existed and that it was reasonable to believe that persons or property were in
immediate danger, as is required under Rusho.

13

Deputy Franssen testifying that, prior to Mr. Ligon-Bruno and Luca exiting the
apartment, he "believe[d] that it was entirely possible that a burglary, a theft, or other
crime had been committed inside of the residence." (Tr.Vol.I, p.44, Ls.13-18.) When
later asked what crime he believed had been committed at the time that he entered
Mr. Ligon-Bruno's apartment, Deputy Franssen testified, "Potentially a burglary."
(Tr.Vol.I, p.59, Ls.15-17.) As will be discussed next, there is no crime scene exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978).
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2.

Assuming, Arguendo. That The Initial Entry Was Justified Based On
Exigent Circumstances. The District Court Erred In Finding That The
Second Entry Was Not A Reentry And That It Was Justified As A
Continuing Protective Sweep

Assuming, arguendo, that the initial entry by Deputy Bixby was justified under the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, the district court
nevertheless erred when it found that the second entry was not a "reentry" and that it
was justified as a continuation of the protective sweep.
Absent exigent circumstances, there is no crime scene exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement.

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394-96 (1978).

In Mincey, the Supreme Court recognized that "when the police come upon the scene of
a homicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are
other victims or if a killer is still on the premises" and that they "may seize any evidence
that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities." Id. at
392-93 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) and Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971 )). Unlike those cases, however, the police investigating Mincey had
already located all of the persons in his apartment by the time that they began "a fourday search that included opening drawers and ripping up carpets." Id., 437 U.S. at 393.
The Court noted that "[t]here was no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed,
or removed during the time required to obtain a search warrant." Id. at 394.
The State, responsible for establishing the applicability of an exception to the
warrant requirement, did not make an argument that there was no reentry, and the
district court cited no case law for its conclusion that the entry of the home by additional
officers following Deputy Bixby's initial sweep was "not necessarily a reentry of the
house." The import of the reentry issue is that it was only after this reentry that officers
discovered the evidence that resulted in the charges against Mr. Ligon-Bruno. (R., p.1 O
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(charging Mr. Ligon-Bruno with possession of a controlled substance, specifically
methamphetamine, with intent to deliver); pp.176-77 (the amended information,
charging Mr. Ligon-Bruno with destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence by
concealing drugs or drug paraphernalia in a toilet tank, the charge to which Mr. LigonBruno entered a conditional plea).) A search justified by exigent circumstances is only
appropriate and justified when it is "strictly circumscribed by the exigency ... and cannot
be used to support a general exploratory search ... an officer may not act outside the
scope of the justification for the entry." State v. Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho 14, 17 (Ct. App.
2001) (citing State v. Sai/as, 129 Idaho 432,435 (Ct. App. 1996)).
Pursuant to Mincey, and assuming that Deputy Bixby's initial warrantless search
of Mr. Ligon-Bruno's apartment was justified in an effort to discover victims in need of
aid or additional perpetrators, there was no basis for the additional warrantless search
of his home that occurred when the deputies took Mr. Ligon-Bruno and the two other
detainees inside the apartment. This is especially true in light of the following testimony
from Deputy Bixby:
[Defense counsel:] When you made that sweep, sir, that first sweep as
counsel puts it, what indications did you find that
would lead you to believe that someone else was
armed or dangerous or anything like that inside the
residence?
[Deputy Bixby:]

Once I was inside?

[Defense counsel:] Yes, sir.
[Deputy Bixby:]

Nothing. That's what a safety sweep is. You go in,
check the residence, come back out.

(Tr.Vol.I, p.121, L.20-p.122, L.2.)
In light of the fact that any exigent circumstances were no longer present before
the second search, the Court's determination that lifting the lid of the toilet during that
20

second search was justified by fear that evidence could be lost or destroyed was
erroneous. According to the testimony elicited at the suppression hearing, it was not
until the second search had begun that officers became concerned about the running of
the toilet.

(Tr.Vol.I, p.104, L.16 - p.106, L.19 (Deputy Bixby testifying that he only

became concerned about the running toilet during the "second sweep").) As such, the
first search could not have provided the basis for any additional exigency concerning
the potential loss or destruction of evidence prior to the second search.

3.

The Third Search, Conducted At The Request Of A Probation Officer,
Was Not Lawful

Mr. Ligon-Bruno asserts that the third search, conducted under the direction of a
probation officer, was not lawful because it was only authorized as a result of the
discovery of contraband during the initial unlawful searches, thereby rendering any
evidence discovered as a result fruit of the poisonous tree.
The law is well-settled that evidence that is discovered through the exploitation of
illegal acts of the police must be suppressed as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." See
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). In this case, the evidence is

undisputed that a probation officer only requested that the police conduct a thorough
search of Mr. Ligon-Bruno's apartment because he had been told of the contraband
discovered during the first two warrantless searches.

(Tr.Vol.I, p.139, L.7 - p.141,

L.15.) As such, if this Court finds that the first two searches were unauthorized, then
the evidence discovered during the third search must be suppressed as the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Ligon-Bruno respectfully requests tl1at this
Court vacate his conviction because the district court erred when it found that the State
had failed to meet its "heavy burden" of proving an exception to the warrant
requirement.
DATED this 28 th day of November, 2011.

SPE~Cf=R J. HAHN
Depu~Btate Appellate Public Defender
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